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"suspect" and such a classification need only "rationally advance[] a
reasonable and identifiable governmental objective[,]" 49 which the
court found in the objective of eliminating improper speculation by the
jury. The court justified the anomalous result by claiming that lifetime
parole ineligibility is relevant to the issue of the defendant's "future
dangerousness" but parole ineligibility for a period of 25 or more years
is not probative of this issue. This rationale is flawed, however, in that it
fails to take into account the drop-off in recidivism after 25 years in
prison and 25 years of aging and maturity. Although parole ineligibility
for a period of years may not have the weight of evidence of parole
ineligibility for life, it is relevant to that issue.
50
It is likely that "rational basis" is the correct equal protection
standard to be applied since capital defendants ineligible for parole for
a period of years are not a"suspect" class. However, to conclude that the
rational justification for not requiring suchjury instructions is thatparole
ineligibility for a period of years is not probative, either as mitigation or
to rebut "future dangerousness," directly contradicts the United States
Supreme Court's rationale in Simmons. Furthermore, as Roach con-
tended, this distinction appears to be unreasonable in that it leads to
anomalous results. It is difficult to see any impropriety in the jury's
248 Va. 485, 487, 450 S.E.2d 361, 362 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1800 (1995)).
49 Id. at* 13 (quotingSchweikerv. Wilson,450 U.S. 221,235 (1981)
and citing also Evans v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 468, 481,323 S.E.2d
114, 122 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1025 (1985)).
50 "In assessing future dangerousness, the actual duration of the
defendant's prison sentence is indisputably relevant." Simmons, 114 S.
Ct. at 2194.
51 Roach, 1996 WL 88107 at *13.
consideration of the effect that a defendant's incarceration might have on
his "future dangerousness." Such a consideration is an essential part of
the jury's determination of the existence of the "future dangerousness"
aggravator. Thus it seems that the court's stated objective is unreason-
able and the classification fails even rational basis scrutiny. This ruling
appears even more unreasonable in the face of the jury's direct question-
ing as to the parole ineligibility of the defendant. By refusing to provide
the jury with the factually correct information, and only telling the jury
not to concern itself with whatmay happen after sentencing, the Supreme
Court of Virginia has, in its own words, done "nothing more than invite
the jury to speculate" 51 on the probability that the defendant will be
paroled from prison in a short period of time if the jury spares his life. In
Simmons, the United States Supreme Court specifically admonished
such a response by the trial court.
5 2
In the few pre-1995 cases that remain, defense counsel are urged to
preserve the post-Simmons issues, including the equal protection claim.
Summary and analysis by:
Douglas S. Collica
52 "The jury was left to speculate about [the defendant's] parole
eligibility when evaluating [his] future dangerousness, and was denied a
straight answer about [the defendant's] parole eligibility even when it
was requested." Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2195. "Far from ensuring that
the jury was not misled, however, [instructing the jury not to consider
parole] actually suggested that parole was available but that the jury, for
some unstated reason, should be blind to this fact." Id. at 2197.
FRY v. COMMONWEALTH
250 Va. 413, 463 S.E.2d 433 (1995)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On February 21, 1994, near the end of Exeter Mill Road in
Chesterfield County, Virginia, Tony Leslie Fry shot a car dealer, Leland
A. Jacobs, eleven times. He and his accomplice, Brad Hinson, had taken
a Ford Explorer out on a test drive with the intent to steal it and to murder
any salesperson who insisted on accompanying them. Fry stopped the
truck on Exeter Road, feigning a need to check the spare tire. AfterJacobs
had exited the truck, Fry told him to "look at that owl." When Jacobs
turned his head, Fry shot him in the back. Fry fired a total of eleven shots
into Jacobs' head, chest, and abdomen. 1
Coincidentally, Officer David L. Suda of the Chesterfield County
Police was looking for Fry on an arson charge when he confronted
Hinson and Fry in the Ford Explorer on Exeter Road shortly after the
killing. Hinson was driving. Suda approached the car and, upon noticing
blood on Fry's hand, asked Fry for an explanation. Fry said that he had
hurt himself "playing in the woods." Suda attempted to handcuff Fry, but
Fry resisted. He ceased resisting, but reached for the glove compartment
I Fty v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 413, 415-16; 463 S.E.2d 433,
434-35.
2 Id.
3 Id. at 417-18; 463 S.E.2d at 435-36.
stating he wanted to kill himself. Suda sprayed Fry with mace. Hinson
immediately dove for the backseat of the truck and grabbed his coat, but
he released it when Officer Suda drew his gun. He then exclaimed his
innocence in the killing and led Suda to Jacobs' body. Fry confessed to
the killing and attested to Hinson's innocence.2 Once in police custody,
Fry was polite, respectful and candid about his part in the killing. He was
also very remorseful.
3
Fry was nineteen years old when he shot Jacobs. He had an IQ of 77
and a dependent personality disorder. His mother abandoned him and he
never knew his father's identity. He was raised by his maternal great-
grandmother, but grew up with few friends and was not involved in any
extra-curricular activities, except for singing in the church choir. His
schooling consisted of special education classes for the emotionally
disturbed. Prior to the shooting, Fry had not engaged in violent conduct.
4
Fry was indicted for capital murder for the willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing of Jacobs during the commission of robbery or
attempted robbery while armed with a deadly weapon.5 Fry pleaded
guilty at an arraignment on October 3, 1994. The court conducted a
4 Id. at 417-19; 463 S.E.2d at 435-36.
5 Id. at 414, 463 S.E.2d at 434 (citing Va. Code Ann. §18.2-31(4)
(Supp. 1994)).
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sentencing hearing on January 5, 1995. After hearing the evidence and
reviewing the pre-sentence report, the court sentenced Fry to death based
on a finding of vileness.
6
Fry appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, raising only the
issue of whether his death sentence was excessive or disproportional to
the penalty imposed in similar cases. The court reviewed Fry's case on
this ground and to determine if his death sentence was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.
7
HOLDING
In affirming, the Supreme Court of Virginia summarily held that
Fry's sentence was "neither excessive nor disproportionate to penalties
generally imposed by other sentencing bodies in the Commonwealth."
The court also concluded that the imposition of Fry's death sentence was
free from passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, finding that the
trial court had acted with "extreme care" in applying the law to the facts
of the offense and in considering all of the evidence in mitigation.8
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. The Perils of Pleading Guilty
A. Sacrificing Legal Issues
Once a defendant enters a guilty plea, the record becomes extremely
constricted and counsel has forgone many potential appellate issues that
arise during a jury trial. First, a guilty plea moots almost all antecedent
defects in the prosecution. Unless specifically excepted as subject to
appellate challenge, this list may include matters such as a flawed
indictment, an inadequate bill of particulars, challenges to the jury array,
and motions for suppression or discovery. In addition to the forgoing pre-
trial issues, the defense loses both the opportunity to appeal trial errors
and the right to challenge the overall sufficiency of the Commonwealth's
proof of capital murder.
But it is not only potential legal issues for appeal that are lost. The
defendant also loses the opportunity to sway a jury or a juror who may
believe that while the facts point to guilt, they do not warrant the death
penalty. Fry's case exemplifies such a situation. Although it is not
completely clearfrom the Supreme Court ofVirginia's opinion what was
argued at the sentencing phase, some of Fry's described actions evi-
denced very child-like characteristics. These characteristics provided an
opportunity to mitigate Fry's culpability and simultaneously to implicate
his co-conspirator.
6 Fry, 250 Va. at 414-15; 463 S.E.2d at 434.
7 Id. at 420, 463 S.E.2d at 437 (citing Va. Code Ann. § 17-110.1 (C)
(1) (Supp. 1994)).
8 Id. at 419-20; 463 S.E.2d at 436-37.
9 Id. at 417; 463 S.E.2d at 435.
10 Petition for Certiorari at 2, Fry v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 413,
463 S.E.2d 433 (Va. 1995) (No. 95-7795), cert. denied, 1996 WL 63336
(Mar. 25,1996) (copy available from the Virginia Capital Case Clearing-
house).
It Fry, 250 Va. at 415-16, 463 S.E.2d at 434-35.
12 The persuasiveness of this argument increases when Fry's
behavior is contrasted to Hinson's. Fry's immature and unthinking
conduct suggests that he did not have the capacity to create and carry out
a plan to steal a car during a test drive by murdering a salesman. Instead,
it appears more likely that his accomplice Brad Hinson thought of the
plan and convinced Fry of the necessity to carry it out. When Officer
Suda confronted them, Hinson was quick to pin the killing on Fry,
asserting his own "innocence" in the meanwhile. Hinson was driving the
Fry's prior unadjudicated acts are those of a ten year-old boy. He set
off fire alarms, vandalized cars, broke into three churches and a fire
station (committing petty thefts in the process), set fire to two residences,
and dug-up a grave.9 Upon closer examination these acts are consistent
with an immature, child-like mind. He broke into churches and a fire
department -targets that suggest a young boy's curiosity. Firefighters
are often the subject of adolescent wonder as are churches and clergy.
Even setting a fire, though more serious and suspect at one level, can be
attributed to a guileless, uncounseled mind. Fry set fire to abandoned
buildings. Playing with fire when it is clear that no one will be hurt is the
crime of a young boy. Digging up a grave site sounds ominous, but when
the motive is to "see what a dead man looked like after he was dead,"
10
it is clear that the action lacked malice. Even in the commission of the
killing, Fry's conduct was unsophisticated. He told the victim to "look at
that owl," and then shot him when he turned his head. Finally, when
Officer Suda asked how his hands became blood-stained, Fry answered
that he was "playing in the woods." 1 This kind of answer does not come
from an artful mind.
Had the case been before a jury, at the very least, counsel would
have had the opportunity to turn this evidence of "criminal activity"
around and convince a juror that Fry was not a leader but a follower.
12
He did not have a criminal record nor did he have a history of violent
behavior, drug use, or alcohol abuse. 13 He was more than compliant with
police. In fact, he confessed three times to the killing. Police officers
testified that Fry was respectful and forthright about his involvement in
this killing and in other criminal activities. 14 His remorseful, respectful,
and submissive demeanor toward authority figures shows that he was
easily controlled and susceptible to being told how and when to act.
These same arguments can be made to a sentencing judge, but she is an
audience of one, whereas a jury is an audience of twelve, one of which
may be persuaded and argue against the imposition of death. Simply put,
counsel's odds of receiving a life sentence for the defendant are usually
much greater if she argues in front of a jury.
Absent ajury trial, the only remaining issues for appeal are sentenc-
ing issues, such as contesting the adequacy of the Commonwealth's case
as to future dangerousness and/or vileness, the constitutionality of the
language that defines these aggravating factors, and the automatic review
issues of proportionality and arbitrary imposition of death. Perhaps the
most promising sentencing issue rests in the pre-sentence report that
must be made and given to the sentencing judge. Counsel may challenge
its accuracy or argue that it is prejudicial. At the same time, such
challenges are subject to the same procedural default rules as all other
issues; if counsel fails to object on both state and federal grounds, the
issues are lost for later review by the state and federal courts.
15
Ford Explorer. He was also smart enough to make sure that Fry pulled
the trigger and that his own hands did not get bloody. Hinson robbed the
victim's wallet and when confronted by Officer Suda immediately dove
for the backseat, retrieving his coat which probably contained what he
had stolen. He knew when he faced trouble and took steps to evade police
and the law. These are the actions of a mature and thinking adult. Fry's
character and actions show a lesser degree of moral turpitude, despite the
fact that he pulled the trigger.
13 Petiton for Certiorari at 2, Fry (No. 95-7795).
14 Fry, 250 Va. at 416, 418; 463 S.E.2d at 434-35, 36.
15 Such a failure, however, may inadvertently give the defendant a
viable ineffective assistance of counsel claim. But counsel are reminded
that the standard for proving ineffective assistance is extremely difficult
to meet. "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). For a better understanding of
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B. The Anders Brief
Given the shrinking record and basis for appeal where a defendant
pleads guilty to capital murder, it may be that appellate counsel will
believe the appeal is frivolous. It is not likely, for instance, that the
Supreme Court of Virginia will find that the death sentence was dispro-
portional or imposed arbitrarily, since it has never done so before.
16
However, even if counsel concludes that an appeal on the merits is
frivolous, she is not relieved of a duty to support an appeal to the best of
her ability. Anders v. California17 requires that counsel, after a careful
review of the record, submit a brief, arguing anything that might support
an appeal. Counsel must also provide a copy of this brief to the defendant
so that she may choose to raise additional points. 18 After submitting this
brief, the state court decides if an appeal would be frivolous. If the court
finds the appeal would be meritless, then counsel can withdraw. 19 If
counsel fails to file an appeal and/or fails to submit anAnders brief, she
has effectively abandoned the defendant and has violated the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.20 Moreover, under Penson v. Ohio,2 1 an
appellate court is required to keep counsel from withdrawing where an
Anders brief has not been submitted. The court is not allowed to engage
in an independent review that amounts to harmless-error analysis.
22
An appeal such as Fry's raises Anders concerns because appellate
counsel did not raise a single "appeal of right issue"; the sole challenge
was to proportionality which is a part of automatic review and not a part
of Fry's appeal of right. And because the Supreme Court of Virginia
failed to require Fry's counsel to submit anAnders brief, he arguably was
abandoned by counsel within the meaning of Anders. At a minimum, the
Virginia Supreme Court should have required appellate counsel to file an
Anders brief subject to the United States Supreme Court's requirements
governing the procedure.
II. Taking Issue with Victim Impact Evidence and The
Commonwealth's Future Dangerousness Case
The Supreme Court of Virginia's description of trial proceedings
raises two issues that should have been appealed or, at a minimum,
included in an Anders brief. One assignment of error originates in the
Commonwealth's introduction of victim impact evidence that exceeded
the permissible scope of this type of evidence under Payne v. Tennes-
see.23 Because the evidence went beyond the scope of Payne's holding,
procedural default in Virginia, see Groot, To Attain The Ends ofJustice:
Confronting Virginia's Default Rules in Capital Cases, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol.6, No.2, p. 4 4 (1994).
16 The Virginia Supreme Court says that a death sentence is
proportionate if "'other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally
impose the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, consider-
ing both the crime and the defendant."' Fry, 250 Va. at 419; 463 S.E.2d
at 436 (quoting Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445,461,423 S.E.2d
360, 371 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1862 (1993)). However, the
court does not engage, at all, in comparing defendants and it compares
crimes by looking at the capital predicate and the aggravating circum-
stances. Thus, if a defendant has committed murder during a robbery and
vileness is found, then so long as death has been imposed on another
defendant for the same general findings, the court finds the death
sentence proportional. The limitation of review to these factors ensures
that every death sentence will be proportional regardless of disparity
between characteristics of individual defendants and the crimes they
commit. Petition for Certiorari at 15-20, Fy (No. 95-7795).
17 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
18 Id. at 744.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 741-45.
it may be constitutionally invalid and, if the sentencing judge relied upon
it in making his determination of vileness, then the validity of his decision
to impose death would be called into question.
InPayne, themotherof thevictim testified that hergrandson missed
his mother and sister who were killed and inquired after them on a daily
basis. The state argued the "impact" on the family to the sentencing
jury.24 The United States Supreme Court, overruling Booth v. Mary-
land25 and South Carolina v. Gathers,26 held that the Eighth Amend-
ment did not erect a per se bar to victim impact evidence.27 The Court
stated that "[a] State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the
victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is
relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty
should be imposed." 28 Most significantly, the Court specifically left
open whether victim impact evidence could be admitted as to people who
are not family members.
29
In Fry's case, the Commonwealth introduced testimony from the
owner of the car dealership where the victim worked. The owner testified
that the victim was "very kind" and an "excellent employee." His
testimony also implied that his business had suffered. His statements
included that his "sales force" was now reluctant to go on test drives with
male customers, and that his top salesperson, a woman, was afraid to
accompany male customers to the back lot after dark.30 As sentencer, the
trial judge, therefore, may have relied upon evidence that was constitu-
tionally impermissible to consider.
3t
A second assignment of error arose out of the Commonwealth's
case of future dangerousness because it encompassed several prior
unadjudicated acts that were of highly dubious quality. Stealing and
vandalizing cars are not acts of violence against human beings. Nor is
burning abandoned buildings. More disturbing was that Fry's digging up
a grave was introduced as an unadjudicated act. The conduct was
irrelevant because it did not involve violence, and, even if of marginal
relevancy, the prejudicial and inflammatory value of this information is
so great that it should never have been admitted. Future dangerousness
evidence must show that the defendant poses aprobability of committing
"criminal acts of violence" that pose a "continuous and serious threat"
to society.32 Yet, all of this evidence was introduced by the Common-
wealth in support of future dangerousness and is precisely the type of
information to which counsel should object.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary E. Eade
21 488 U.S. 75 (1988).
22 Id. at 86.
23 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
24 Id. at 814-16.
25 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
26 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
27 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
28 Id. (emphasis added).
29 Id. at 830 n.2.
30 Fiy, 250 Va. at 417; 463 S.E.2d at 435.
31 To have a colorable claim, counsel would need to investigate
whether the sentencing judge relied upon this evidence in her finding of
vileness. In Virginia, unfortunately, unlike the majority of the states,
there is no requirement that a sentencing judge make a written report that
evinces her rationale for finding an aggravating factor. However, some
judges will engage in this task. Therefore, counsel faced with a similar
situation should inquire into the record for any evidence showing that the
judge relied upon what could be constitutionally impermissible victim
impact evidence.
32 Va. Code. Ann. § 19.2-264.4(c); see also, Michael H. Spencer,
Challenging the Future Dangerousness Aggravating Factor, Capital
Defense Journal, this issue.
